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Abstract
The incidence of food security breaches have been on the rise over the past decade.
The goal of this paper is to devise an optimum investment strategy by food companies
(retailers and manufacturers) to mitigate exposure to catastrophic risks. To do this, we de-
velop and estimate a simple analytical model, using probability measures for catastrophic
risks associated with food, from our prior research, together with the results of a "Bench-
marking and Assessment Survey" of food companies. The limitations on the availability of
catastrophic risk insurance and their high level of deductibility, together with the one-time
nature of the alternative risk-mitigating investments suggest that such investments should
be undertaken whether or not catastrophic risk insurance is available, particularly since
these investments have a large impact on risk financing. Such investments may protect
long term reputations and brand ratings in addition to mitigating potential catastrophic
losses.
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Optimum Investments to Mitigate Catastrophic Risk:
Application to Food Industry Firms
1 Introduction
There are an estimated 76 million foodborne illnesses caused by pathogens, 325,000 hos-
pitalizations, and 5,000 deaths in the United States each year (Mead et. al. 1999, CDC).
In addition, since 2001 there has been increasing concern about intentional food conta-
mination. The possibility that food could be used as vehicle for terrorism has been of
grave concern to the World Health Organization (see WHO 2002). For example, evi-
dence points to an increase in the severity of intentional attacks over the past decade
(Mohtadi-Murshid, 2007). See Figure 1.
Figure 1. Frequency of Attacks on the Food or Water Supply 
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Source: Based on authors chronology of CBRN-events and the sources cited therein. 
While insurance against accidents is common in any industry, insurance against the risk
of terrorism has been extremely expensive if not outright impossible to obtain, especially
after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 (c.f., Kunreuther. et. al., 2005 and Auerswald, et. al.
2006). Given these limitations on insurance, and given the broad exposure of population
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to any food related event, in this paper we focus on what the food industry can and should
do by way of investment to mitigate such risks.
One of the principal reasons why catastrophic and especially terrorism insurance mar-
kets have not been adequate is the difficulty that exists in assessing low frequency high
impact risks and the uncertainties that are associated with measuring such risks. In
a previous line of research conducted by Mohtadi and Murshid (2004-2006) and broadly
identified as "Risk Metrics Project,"
3
we have attempted to take a first step at addressing
this shortcoming by developing quantitative probability measures using a novel statistical
methodology to calculate catastrophic risks from intentional contamination of food by
chemical or biological agents. While it is hoped that these new measures find their way to
the insurance industry and are ultimately adopted, that task is beyond us at the present
time. In the meantime, however, the probability measures developed under this project
which are based on primary data also collected under this project (Mohtadi and Murshid,
2006a), may be used to find a "best practice" strategy. For the purposes of this research,
a best practice strategy consists of finding the optimum level of investments that firms
wishing to mitigate the impact of catastrophic risks should undertake or are undertaking.
This is the task of the present study. This work is made possible by developing an ana-
lytical model that is calibrated by the data, not only from the probability measures of the
Risk Metrics Project, but also from another project involving a survey of 217 food com-
panies consisting of 59 food retailers, 124 food manufacturers and 34 logistics providers
that was jointly developed and administered by Universities of Minnesota, Michigan State
and Georgia Institute of Technology (Closs and Kinsey 2005-2007). This is known as the
"Benchmarking and Assessment Survey."
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Some of the econometric results from that sur-
vey, which are found from a working paper by Agaiwal, Mohtadi and Kinsey (2007), are
then used in the present study.(For reasons discussed later, we will only use the survey
results from the food manufacturers and retailers.)
Our results suggest that in comparison to a regulated rate for terrorism risk insurance,
the optimum level of investments to mitigate risk is somewhat larger, but does depend
on the level of risk. However, the limitations that exist on the availability of catastrophic
insurance at these regulated rates, and their high level of deductibility, together with the
one-time nature of the alternative risk-mitigating investment strategies suggest that such
3
This research was sponsored by the University of Minnesota’s National Center for Food Protection
and Defense (NCFPD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and has led to a number of
publications and working papers several of which are cited at the end of this paper.
4
This work is also sponsored by the University of Minnesota’s National Center for Food Protection
and Defense (NCFPD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and is still ongoing.
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investments should be undertaken whether or not catastrophic risk insurance is available,
particularly as their impact on risk financing may not be negligible at all.
Following the development of the analytical model in section 2, the estimation method
and the results are presented in section 3. Section 4 makes some concluding observations
based on the comparison of our results with those of catastrophic insurance.
2 A Simple Analytical Model
Consider investing K in infrastructure/ business practice/ etc. ex-anti to improve re-
sponsiveness to a catastrophic event, should such an event occur. Let L be the nominal
loss in the case of an event. Then an initial investment of K, could reduce the impact
of the loss by a fraction λ(K) such that λ(K)L < L and λ(K) < 1. Higher values of
initial investments reduce the impact of the loss L so that λ
′
(K) < 0. Thus, λ(K) may be
interpreted as the "loss reduction coefficient." However, this reduction in loss is bounded
from below (by zero) as the law of diminishing marginal productivity would imply. Thus
without loss of generality one can assume that λ
”
(K) > 0 and that λ(K)
lim k→∞
−→ 0, as
shown below:
 
)(Kλ  
K 
1 
Figure 2 
Many functional forms satisfy the above requirement. We shall return to this issue
shortly.
If pi
L
is the probability of an event of magnitude L, then the expected loss in the
absence of investment is
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E(L|pi
L
)
no invest
= pi
L
L (1)
In the case of investing K the expected loss is:
E(L|pi
L
)
invest
= pi
L
λ(K)L+K (2)
Thus, while the event cannot be avoided, prior mitigating action can reduce the extent
of loss from the event. Suppose the overall stream of profits from production is Π
o
. Then
expected profits from investing and non-investing in security measures are, respectively,
E(Π
invest
) = Π
o
−E(L|pi
L
)
invest
= Π
o
− pi
L
λ(K)L−K (3)
E(Π
no invest
) = Π
o
−E(L|pi
L
)
no invest
= Π
o
− pi
L
L (4)
The expected net gain from investing, given the probability pi
L
, is denoted by G(pi
L
)
and is found from
G(pi
L
) = E(L|pi
L
)
invest
−E(L|pi
L
)
no invest
= pi
L
[1− λ(K)]L−K (5)
Notice that G(pi
L
) is  0 if pi
L
 pi where pi is the threshold value of event probability
and is given by p¯i ≡ (K/L).(1/[1 − λ(K)] . This implies that for events with very low
probability, a firm could lose by investing K!
Catastrophic events, which are the focus of this work, are by nature low frequency high
impact events. Developing accurate metrics of catastrophic risk is not easy. The challenge
arises because of the need to extrapolate from observed levels in data to unobserved levels.
Classical statistical methods are not well-suited for this task (Coles 2001, Embrechts et al.
1997). Instead, the appropriate approach is to estimate catastrophic risk using extreme
value (EV) analysis. By exploiting limiting arguments extreme value models can provide
an approximate description of the stochastic behavior of extremes. This is both discussed
and measured in Mohtadi and Murshid (2006b, 2006c, 2007). Thus, pi(L) ∼ f(L),where
f(L) is an EV probability distribution function. The expected gain from an event of
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that leads to a loss of size in the range L
o
to L
1
is obtained from the EV probability
distribution function such that,
G(pi
L
0
<L<L
1
) = [1− λ(K)]
L
1
∫
L
o
f(L).L.dL−K (6)
Owing to the complexity of the term inside the integral, we will approximate G by re-
placing L inside the integral with its linear mean,
¯
L = (L
o
+L
1
)/2 to get:
G(pi
L
0
<L<L
1
)
∼
=
[1− λ(K)]
¯
L[F (L|
L>L
o
) −F (L|
L>L
1
)]−K (7)
where F (L) is the "anti-cumulative" distribution function of L , i.e., 1-cumulative density
function of L.
2.1 Optimum Investments
Maximizing the net gains from security investments, Max
(K)
G(pi
L
0
<L<L
1
)(K), leads to a
value K
∗
that satisfies the first order condition below
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:
λ
′
(K
∗
)
¯
L[F (L|
L>L
o
)− F (L|
L>L
1
)] = −1 (8)
Deriving an explicit expression for optimum capital expenditures, K
∗
, depends on the
functional forms used. But such functions must all satisfy the criteria discussed earlier.
If we use the following form,
λ(K) =
1
1 + θK
α
θ > 0, 0 < α < 1 (9)
then the requirement that λ
′
< 0, λ
”
> 0, λ(0) = 1, and λ(K)
lim k→∞
−→ 0, are all satisfied.
For this specification, the first order condition yields:
(1 + θK
∗α
)
2
= [F (L|
L>L
o
) −F (L|
L>L
1
)]
¯
LθαK
∗α−1
(10)
We can use equation 10 along with 9 to both simplify the expression for K
∗
and also to
substitute for the value of θ in terms of λ. The reason for the latter is that, as we shall
5
The second order condition is satisfied since λ” > 0
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see below, the empirical results from the "Benchmarking Survey" are closely associated
with the values of λ rather than θ. Substituting from 9 into 10 we find:
1
λ
2
= [F (L|
L>L
o
)− F (L|
L>L
1
)]
¯
LθαK
∗α−1
(11)
In turn, we find from 9 that θK
α
= (1− λ)/λ. Substituting this value into 11 we find
the optimum level of investments K
∗
to be:
K
∗
= α
¯
L[F (L|
L>L
o
)− F (L|
L>L
1
)]λ(1− λ) (12)
3 Estimation and Results
There are two values to use to estimate K
∗
in 12. The anti-cumulative probability val-
ues of F (L|
L>L
o
) and the parameter λ.The anti-cumulative distribution function values
are based on data complied by Mohtadi and Murshid (2006a). This work compiles 448
incidents of Chemical Biological and Radionuclear (CBRN) attacks from 1960s to 2005.
Mohtadi and Murshid (2006b and 2006c) then calculate the probability of any such attack
worldwide of a given magnitude or larger (in terms of the number of injuries) for differ-
ent time horizons. These probability values are presented in the third column of table 1
below. The fourth and the fifth column then convert this anti-cumulative probability to
the probability values F (L|
L
o
<L<L
1
) compatible with equation 12. Although any attack
on the food sector will be of a CBRN nature, not every CBRN attack involves food. In
fact, only about 60 of the CBRN incidents revolved around food (For a full chronology
see Mohtadi and Murshid 2006a). Assuming a uniform distribution of CBRN attacks on
food and non-food as our first prior, the above probabilities are adjusted in column five
by the factor 60/448 or 0.134. This is presented in the final column of the table.
7
Table 1 
Probabilities of a CBRN Attack of Various Magnitudes 
(based on Extreme Value Analysis) and Extrapolated 
Probabilities of Attacks on Food Sources
Number of Time Horizon Anti-Cumulative Prob. Prob. of  a CBRN Adjusted prob. 
casualties of CBRN at various # of casualties event between for attacks 
casualty levels on food
1000 Current risk 0.310 1000-5000       0.143 0.019
5000 0.167 5000-10000 0.034 0.005
10000 0.133 10000-15000 0.055 0.007
15000 0.078
1000 5-year forecast 0.546 1000-5000       0.251 0.034
5000 0.295 5000-10000 0.071 0.009
10000 0.225 10000-15000 0.095 0.013
15000 0.130
1000 10-year forecast 0.732 1000-5000       0.211 0.028
5000 0.520 5000-10000 0.110 0.015
10000 0.410 10000-15000 0.119 0.016
15000 0.291
1000 20-year forecast 0.863 1000-5000       0.095 0.013
5000 0.768 5000-10000 0.057 0.008
10000 0.712 10000-15000 0.077 0.010
15000 0.634
Source for column 3: Mohtadi and Murshid (2006b) and additional extrapolations
10 LtoL 10 LtoL
)( 0LLF ≥ )()( 10 LLFLLF ≥−≥
Before we proceed further, several features of Table 1 deserve attention. First, there are
two key features of the anti-cumulative probability distribution of an event associated with
x number of casualties or greater, in column 3 of Table 1, that deserve a mention. One; for
a given time horizon, the anti-cumulative probability falls, as one would expect: The more
severe an event, the less likely it is to occur.
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Two; moving across time horizons, the anti-
cumulative probability for a given x rises with longer time horizons! This interestingly
but alarming result is a unique feature of the data and the fact that with the recent
experience with terrorism and bioterrorism events, more sever events have become more
likely in time (i.e., the tail parameter of the extreme value distribution shows a time
trend. See Mohtadi-Murshid 2006b and 2006b for more details). Thus, an event leading
to casualty level of 15000 or more has a chance of under 1 percent in the current time
horizon, but over 63 percent in a 20-year time frame!
Secondly , there are also two key features of the incremental probability distribution
associated with area segments between two loss levels in column 5 that also deserve
attention: One; for any given time horizon, the probability segments first fall with severity
and then rise, exhibiting a U-like behavior. Closer scrutiny reveals that this pattern results
because in column 3 the decline in the event probability, from a 5000+ to a 10,000+
6
However, we must add these tail events still turn out to be fatter than a normal density tail, a feature
of these extreme value distributions discussed in Mohtadi-Murshid 2006b.
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casualty event, is much smaller than the decline from a 10,000+ to a 15,000+ casualty
event. This pattern turn out to have significant implications for the amount of investment
food companies have to make as a fraction of potential losses they would like to avoid,
and produces a U shaped curve (Figure 3) that we will come to later. Two; moving across
time horizons, with one exception, the probability segments for any given segment (say L
1
to L
2
) rises for the first three time horizons (current, 5-year, 10-year), but fall for the last
time horizon.
7
The reason for the fall seems to be the very large probability of the fat tail
event in the last time horizon (15000 or more casualties). This large probability of 63%
seems to take away areas from the other segments in this time horizon, again consistent
with the time trend we have found for more extreme events.
Next, the "levels of injury" must be translated into dollar loss. To do this, we rely
on a simple conversion factor from the forensic literature, where the value of $1 million
is used for the loss of life. In the case of injuries, which by far dominate the data, we
will adjust the conversion factor to $0.5 million. The assumption is that an injury or
death will generate a liability for which the firm is ultimately responsible. We recognize
that this is an overly simplified approach. For example, the economic impact on the firm
might include such factors as reputation effects, loss of future markets, etc., and this
impact might be vastly greater than the liability loss associated with injury or death. But
in defense of this approach, it may be pointed out that those effects are indirect effects
whereas the focus at this point is the direct effects. In any case, the result will be that
the size of the expected gain (expected loss avoidance) from risk mitigating investments
by firms may be significantly larger than the values obtained here and that our estimates
will be only a conservative lower bound for what is actually needed.
Values of λ are estimated from the results of a survey of food companies. As was
mentioned at the introduction, the survey questionnaire was jointly developed and admin-
istered by Universities of Minnesota, Michigan State and Georgia Institute of Technology.
This questionnaire was sent out to participants in the food industry supply chain such as,
food service retailers and wholesalers, grocery retailers and wholesalers, food service dis-
tributors, food manufacturers, processors and distributors and logistics providers. There
were total of 217 firms consisting of 124 manufacturing companies, 59 retailers and 34
logistic providers Responses were on more than 100 questions. The responsibility of fill-
ing out the survey lay with individuals in Operations, Supply chain, Quality Assurance,
Security, or Risk Management departments.
7
The minor exception is the first segment (1000-5000 casualties) only rise for the first two time horizons
(current and 5-year) but not the third (or fourth).
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The primary focus of this survey was to collect firm level responses on their various
security practices. Two other recent studies on food security practices, one on food service
operations in Kansas (Yoon and Shanklin, 2007), and one on resilience in the U.K. food
and drink industry (Peck, 2006), have also used survey data on security practices. However
their scope of focus and the methodology is distinct from ours in that they have either a
narrower focus (food service operations in schools and hospital in Kansas) or a qualitative
case-study approach (detailed interviews with only 25-30 organizations in the U.K. food
and drink industry).
The questionnaire on Security Benchmarking is divided into three distinct sections.
The first section (I) asks various questions with respect to the security practices that
the firms follow as prevention, detection, recovery and responsiveness measures to build
resiliency within the firms as well as along the supply chain. The second section (II) focuses
on the firm characteristics such as annual revenues, market size, supply chain scope,
number of employees nationally and internationally, and also the employment profile of
the employee primarily responsible for filling out this questionnaire. The third section
(III) captures the impact of changes in security investments of the firms on outcome
measures such as whether that was increased resilience, reduced risk profile, or reduced
number of security incidents experienced, as a result of security investments by the firms.
Given our interest in developing a measure of the parameter λ, our focus will be on this
last section alone.
Out of the 217 observations, two had to be dropped due to incompleteness, resulting in
215 observations. In addition, owing to the variance in the nature of questions asked from
the logistics providers under section III (which is the relevant section for our purpose),
and the inherently different nature of their security concerns, this group was also dropped
from our present observations, leading to a total of 181 food manufacturers and retailers.
The respondents’ profile is given in Table 2.
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median 1001-5000 501-1000 $100M-$500M Global Global
max 50,000+ 50,000+ $1B+ Global Global
Manufacturers min 0-100 0-100 >$20M Local Local
median 1001-5000 0-100 $500M-$1B Regional National
max 50,000+ 50,000+ $1B+ Global Global
Retailers min 0-100 0-100 >$20M Local Local
M: Million
B:Billion
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of firm chracteristics for each firm type
Firm Type Annual Revenue
Market 
Area
Supplier 
Base
* Annual Revenue, Market Area and Number of Employees Internationally is not avaliable for 
Logistic Providers 
Number of 
Employees 
Number of 
Employees 
Section III of the survey which, as mentioned, is our focus here, entails a large number
of questions for which responses are categorical and range from 1 to 5. One of the most
significant series of questions are questions of the following type that would allow for the
estimate of a "response function from risk mitigating investments to actual results. An
example of these types of questions is the following question:
“Our firm’s security investment has resulted in––—security incidents.”
Responses to questions of this type, to be inserted in the blank space, ranged from
the value of 1 (significantly reduced) to 5 (significantly increase) and 6 (N/A).
Response to this question indicated a significant reduction in reported incidents by
firms which have made security investments in the first place. While there is a possibility
that an action taken by a firm could lead to the perception of success by a respondent,
whether or not the actual number of incidents has declined, this issue cannot be settled in
this paper. This is the subject of an ongoing work by Agiwal, Mohtadi and Kinsey (2007)
that is based on Latent Trait Analysis, a method common in psychology, to decipher
underlying traits in surveys. For now, however, we will assume that the results of the
survey do in fact capture objectively the relation between security investments and the
outcome of the investments, in terms of reduced risk. With this caveat, the results from
Agiwal, Mohtadi and Kinsey (2007), when they are broken down into food manufacturers
and food retailers yield the following means and variances as well as the associated value
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of λ. These value are entered based on the discussion that follows this table:
Table 3
mean variance associated λ *
food manufacturing 1.72 .47 0.67
food retail 1.73 .46 0.67
* See below for the calculation of λ
It would be reasonable to assume that reductions in security incidents are linearly
proportional to reductions in expected losses from such incidents. This is given by the
expression [1 − λ]L. However, the mapping from the values in the survey to the actual
values of λ is somewhat arbitrary. For the lack of a more rigorous criterion, we will
assume that an answer of "1" to the survey question, i.e., significant reduction in the
number of security incidents, implies a reduction in incidents by 2/3 (λ = 2/3) and that
an answer of 2 implies a reduction by 1/2 (λ = 1/2). Interpolating, the mean value of 1.7
from the above table would imply that λ  .67. This is entered in the last column of the
table.
We now have sufficient information to estimate the optimum value of security invest-
ments a firm would need as self-insurance. For λ = 0.67, and for the various levels of
injury and time horizons given and the associated probabilities in table 1 the optimum
level of risk mitigating investments can be calculated from equation 12 (using a values of
0.5). The results are reported in the table below:
Table 4
Estimated Values of secuity investment for different loss levels and Time Horizons
Range of Mean # monetary value of loss probability of loss Optimum Optimum 
casualties of casualties coming from injury between Lo and L1 investments K* investments K* 
Lo to L1 (in $ million) in $ million as % of loss
Current risk 1000-5000       3000 1,500.00 0.019 3.18 0.21%
5000-10000 7500 3,750.00 0.005 1.87 0.05%
10000-15000 12500 6,250.00 0.007 5.08 0.08%
5-year forecast 1000-5000       3000 1,500.00 0.034 5.57 0.37%
5000-10000 7500 3,750.00 0.009 3.92 0.10%
10000-15000 12500 6,250.00 0.013 8.79 0.14%
10-year forecast 1000-5000       3000 1,500.00 0.028 4.70 0.31%
5000-10000 7500 3,750.00 0.015 6.13 0.16%
10000-15000 12500 6,250.00 0.016 11.02 0.18%
20-year forecast 1000-5000       3000 1,500.00 0.013 2.10 0.14%
5000-10000 7500 3,750.00 0.008 3.16 0.08%
10000-15000 12500 6,250.00 0.010 7.15 0.11%
Source: Based on Table 1 and analysis in the text
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Focusing on the last column of Table 4, a one-time capital investment aimed at mit-
igating extreme risk ranges from 37 cents per $100.00 in a 10-year time-horizon, for a
potential loss of 1.5 billion dollars, to 5 cents per $100.00, in the current time-horizon,
associated with a loss of 3.75 billion dollars. The larger percentage associated with the
smaller loss seems puzzling at first. The key to the puzzle is the associated probabilities.
The event with a higher risk mitigation cost has a probability of 3.4% while the event
with the lower percentage cost has a probability of only 0.5 percent.
An interesting feature of Table 4, which is also reflected in Figure 3, is the fact that
for any given time horizon, investments in risk mitigation as a percent of the potential
loss, decline for a range of losses only to rise beyond that range, producing an inverted
U pattern. As mentioned in conjunction with Table 1, this pattern has to do with the
probability segments involved in both tables: for any given time horizon, the probability
segments first fall with severity and then rise, producing the U shaped curve. Closer
scrutiny revealed that this pattern results because the decline in the event probability,
from a 5000+ to a 10,000+ casualty event, is much smaller than the decline from a
10,000+ to a 15,000+ casualty event (See Table 1, column 3). This in turn has to do with
the larger than normal likelihoods of low-frequency, high impact "tail" events, captured
in Extreme Value Statistical Analysis. A second feature of Figure 3 is the nature of the
shifts in the four curves. Specifically, notice that at the high end of the risk scale, while
extreme events associated with high monetary loss or high casualty (right end of X axis)
become more costly with longer time horizons because they become more likely (recall
the time trend associated with fat tails discussed earlier), the pattern seems to break
down for 20-year time horizons. This anomaly is connected with the feature of table 1
discussed earlier, namely that for this time horizon the much higher likelihood of an event
with 15,000+ casualty takes away from previous segments including the probability of
10,000-15000 casualty event. A third feature of the figure, namely the crossing of the
curves, is not as critical as it simply reflects the various trade-offs between time horizons
and event likelihood that occurs at the intermediate segments of risk.
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4 Comparison with Catastrophic Insurance: Conclud-
ing Remarks
How do expenditures aimed at risk mitigation compare with the purchase of catastrophic
risk insurance? To gain some insights into the answer to this question consider the fact
that in 2002 the Insurance Service Office assigned insurance cost of approximately 10 cents
per $100 loss for the highest risk cities, but after discussions with the regulators, these
rates were later adjusted downwards to less than 3 cents per $100 of loss (See Auerswald,
et. al. 2006, pp. 283). This suggests that loss mitigation costs are as high or higher than
the cost of catastrophic insurance. While risk mitigation and insurance are not entirely
comparable strategies due to continued risk exposure under risk mitigation strategies, still
the high deductibles of catastrophic insurance make the two approaches more comparable
than might appear at the first glance. In this respect, several points need to be stressed.
First, risk mitigation investments are one-time actions. For example, a one time capital
expenditure of 5 cents per $100 from table 2 to mitigate the risk of an event that could
cause $3.75 billion loss in the current time horizon, pays off compared to the purchase
of catastrophic insurance after the fifth year. The key of course is that risk mitigation is
not full proof so that risk is not eliminated, but only reduced. As mentioned, however,
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this fact needs to be balanced against the fact that catastrophic risk insurance often
entails large deductibles and, therefore, at least up to the deductible level, risk mitigation
expenditures remain relevant whether or not catastrophic insurance is purchased.
Second, the availability of catastrophic insurance has become more limited after 9/11
attacks, due to a variety of complicating factors, including (a) the increased risk trend (for
evidence see Mohtadi and Murshid 2006c; for discussion see Bogen and Jones, 2006), (b)
the large size of the losses, requiring far greater pooling of resources than has been available
to insurers and reinsures, (c) the uncertainties associated with calculating the probabilities
of catastrophic insurance
8
and (d) the asymmetric information between insurance firms
and the insured on the one hand, and the reinsurance firms and insurance firms on the
other, resulting in a double moral hazard problem (Auerswald, ibid)
Third, as stated previously, issues such as reputation effects cannot be overlooked.
These affects cannot be easily addressed by the purchase of insurance, especially if they
are the outcome of inadequate risk mitigation by firms in the first place.
Fourth, the adequate coverage of catastrophic insurance together with the large poten-
tial losses and the associated "risk externalities" call for the involvement of the Federal,
state and local governments (see Auerswald, et. al. 2006, pp. 284), as this becomes
a clear case of market failure. In fact the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) and
its eleventh hour extension in December of 2005 is aimed at addressing the gaps in this
market. However, many obstacles remain and catastrophic insurance remains a highly
imperfect tool with limited or no availability in many cases. Thus, until and unless these
issues are resolved risk mitigation becomes a important and essential strategy.
Fifth, while risk mitigation is not well correlated with insurance costs, due to moral
hazard problems associated with asymmetric information between the insured and the
insurer (again see Auerswald, et. al. 2006, pp. 283), it is likely that catastrophic risk
mitigation will have a positive effect on the cost of risk financing, if not risk insurance.
For example, Moody’s risk ratings are highly affected by the ability of firms to prepare for
and respond to risk. For all these reasons the importance of catastrophic risk mitigation
strategies cannot be overstated and such strategies must be an essential part of firms’
overall strategy.
8
On this point, we hope that this contribution will be of value. We argue that terrorism risk is
quantifiable in the same manner as weather risk may be.
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